Policy-makers and managers often turn to experts when in need of information: because they are more informed than others of the content and quality of current and past research, they should provide the best advice. I show, however, that we should expect experts to be systematically biased, potentially to the point that they are less reliable sources of information than non-experts. This is because the decision to research a question implies a belief that research will be fruitful. If priors about the impact of current work are correct, on average, then those who select into researching a question are optimistic about the quality of current work. In areas that are new, or feature new research technologies (e.g., data sources, technical methods, or paradigms), the selection problem is less important than the bene…t of greater knowledge: experts will indeed be experts. In areas that are old and lack new research technologies, there will be signi…cant bias. Furthermore, consistent with a large body of empirical research, this selection problem implies that experts who express greater con…dence in their beliefs will be, on average, less accurate. This paper provides many empirical implications for expert accuracy, as well as mechanism design implications for hiring, task assignment, and referee assignment.
the interpretation to the reader.
The model works as follows: in each period, researchers enter …elds (e.g., start PhDs) and decide which questions to research (e.g., decide upon a dissertation topic). In making their decisions, they observe past research on each question, the existence and quality of which is common knowledge, and form private beliefs of the likely usefulness of future work on each question. These beliefs are, in expectation, correct. Each researcher ultimately chooses a question that she considers important, and for which she believes her work will be productive. After choosing a question, the researcher studies the question and updates her beliefs, taking into account past and current work. She does not observe current research on other questions, and therefore does not update her beliefs about the answers to those questions. Once this cohort of researchers has formed opinions, a policy-maker or manager interested in the answer to a question may solicit opinions from experts and non-experts alike, where a non-expert is de…ned to be a researcher in the …eld who has not seen new work (e.g., since graduate school) on the speci…c question of interest. Note that a nonexpert is not a layman -she is familiar with past research on a question, but her knowledge is not up-to-date.
The fundamental trade-o¤ for the policy-maker is that, while experts are more knowledgeable about current research, the very fact that they have chosen to study a particular question suggests that they may fundamentally disagree with others -who have chosen di¤erent questions -about the likely productivity of research on that question. At each step in the analysis, I make assumptions that are as favorable as possible for the conclusion that experts provide better advice than non-experts. I assume that: (i) only experts can observe current research on a topic, (ii) their utilities depend only upon their ultimate contributions to knowledge, and (iii) they want to convey the most accurate information possible to a querying policy-maker. The key assumption driving the results is that ex-perts do not understand the selection problem. That is, when forming an opinion about the true answer to the question they study, they assume that their beliefs of the quality of current research are unbiased. In truth, while their beliefs are unbiased ex ante, they are not unbiased conditional on having chosen a particular question. It would perhaps be reasonable to allow for more signi…cant bias among researchers; after all, the psychological evidence appears to con…rm that many experts appear to su¤er from decidedly …rst-order biases, such as overcon…dence and narcissism. I show, however, that …rst-order biases are unnecessary to cast doubt on expertise. 1 The model yields several appealing results. The …rst set concerns the decision to research a question. For example, I show that researchers are more likely to study a question if the question is newer, more important, and less studied historically. This is because the marginal impact of research is higher when the quantity of past research is lower and when the question is more important. A researcher is more likely to choose a question if the data and/or techniques available for studying the question have recently improved. This is because the quality of new research, relative to old, is higher. She also is more likely to study a question if she believes that such work will be fruitful. For example, a young economics Ph.D. candidate that sees behavioral theories as plausible is more likely to study the question of how people time-discount than a candidate who sees those theories as implausible. These results should conform closely to the reader's intuition about how young researchers choose their research topics, providing some comfort that the model accurately captures the process of becoming an expert.
The second set of results concerns how properties of a question relate to the likely accuracy of expert and non-expert beliefs. Experts put too much weight on current work, on average, but some questions have a more severe problem than others. Speci…cally, questions that are less important, more heavily studied historically, less heavily studied currently, and do not feature novel research technologies are associated with less reliable experts.
Because the amount of published research is always weakly increasing, and because the content and quality of that research is common knowledge after its publication and dissemination, non-expert knowledge is always increasing. However, as knowledge about a question increases, the marginal bene…t of additional research on that question decreases.
The people who still choose to study it are therefore increasingly biased over time. Expert opinion is better than non-expert opinion when a question is new: there is little published work for non-experts to observe, and little selection into becoming an expert. Expert opinion is less better over time, as the amount of new research relative to past research decreases and as selection into the question becomes more severe. At some point, the level of selection into a question is so signi…cant that expert opinion is less accurate than non-expert opinion.
The third set of results concerns how the properties of the …eld relate to the likely accuracy of expert and non-expert beliefs. Growing …elds o¤er many opportunities for novel and important research, implying less accurate expert opinions for older questions in these …elds. Static …elds o¤er few interesting alternative questions, so researchers studying an old question need not be particularly biased.
The fourth set of results concerns how the properties of the experts themselves relates to the quality of their opinions. Because the selection into expertise is more severe over time, older researchers are generally less biased than younger. This means that, for the most part, it is better to solicit the views of older researchers about current work.
The exception is when signi…cant new research technologies become available concerning a question. In this case, work on the question is likely to be more fruitful, attracting less biased researchers. For example, the great recession beginning in 2007 provided a wealth of new data regarding the business cycle and …nancial crises. Researchers choosing to study questions in these areas post-2007 are likely to be less biased than those studying these questions prior to 2007. Researchers choosing questions in these periods form what I call "golden cohorts", in that they have more accurate opinions than older researchers when they are young, and more accurate opinions than younger researchers when they are old.
For their entire careers, they are the most expert. One could argue that these cohorts have appeared, in practice, surrounding innovations in research opportunities (e.g., in economics, the discovery/invention of game theory, the marginal revolution, or the capital asset pricing model).
I also show that extrinsically motivated experts' beliefs can be more accurate than those of intrinsically motivated experts. Motivation matters because it determines how a question is chosen. Intrinsically motivated experts choose questions based upon where they believe they are likely to have an impact, but a belief of impact can be due to either actual impact or a bias. Extrinsically motivated experts prefer questions where they expect to have impact, but also prefer questions where past work was more precise, because quality past work improves current prediction. These preferences imply less selection into questions and therefore less bias.
The …fth set of results concerns the relationship between experts' self-assessed and actual accuracies. Because past work is common knowledge, di¤erences in experts' selfassessments arise from di¤erences in priors regarding the quality of current work. Researchers that are pessimistic, in the sense that they believe current work is worse than it actually is, will report lower con…dence in their beliefs than researchers with correct priors. Because they underweight current work, they also have less precise posteriors: in the "pessimistic domain", self-assessed and actual accuracy positively correlate. Researchers that are optimistic will report higher con…dence in their beliefs, but will overweight current work and therefore have less accurate posteriors than researchers with correct priors: in the "optimistic domain", self-assessed and actual accuracy negatively correlate. If there were no selection into expertise, the empirical correlation between self-assessed and actual accuracy would be approximately zero, but because pessimistic researchers will choose alternative areas of expertise, the empirical correlation among experts will be negative. 2 This relationship has been observed in dozens of studies, and this model provides an endogenous basis for it.
The sixth set of results concern mechanism design applications: (i) who should write tenure letters? (ii) when hiring a worker (e.g., as a term-structure modeler at an investment bank), should one hire a more intrinsically motivated expert (e.g., a person with a Ph.D.
in …nance) or a more …nancially motivated expert (e.g., a physicist)? (iii) when assigning workers to tasks, what discretion should they have over the choice of task?
This model relates to literatures in economics and psychology. Much of the early work in optimal learning assumes that people are Bayesian, and centers upon one of two questions.
First, how should one trade o¤ experimentation, which improves one's knowledge, and using that knowledge productively? For example, the "multi-armed bandit problem" (Robbins, 1952 ) assumes several gambles with unknown payo¤s, and a gambler that must choose which gamble to take in each period. There is value to experimenting, in that the gambler learns about the payo¤ distribution from each gamble, but there is also value to choosing gambles that have paid o¤ well in the past. Second, how should one incorporate information provided by others into one's own beliefs, and how does this rule a¤ect the opportunity for information transmission in di¤erent settings? This so-called "cheap talk" literature began with Crawford and Sobel (1982) and has become quite extensive (see, e.g., Krishna and Morgan, 2001 , 2004 , and Aumann and Hart, 2003 . It is typically assumed that the one providing the information has di¤erent preferences from the one receiving the information, providing an incentive to muddle the information and making the inference problem di¢ cult. In this paper, I assume that the one providing the information genuinely wishes to be accurate, but ask when we should expect her information to be accurate. This is one step primitive to the standard question of how to elicit and interpret her information.
In the last decade, this literature has ‡ourished in a variety of ways. Aragones et al (2005) separate two mechanisms of learning -collecting and analyzing information -and show that sorting through information is considerably more di¢ cult than one might assume.
This provides a theoretical basis for the widely observed phenomenon that theories that are "obvious"once pointed out can nonetheless be insightful when …rst presented. 3 Epstein and Schneider (2007) study the problem of learning under ambiguity, o¤ering an alternative to the Bayesian world in which the "truth" does not become perfectly understood over time.
Many equilibrium concepts in economics rely upon the game being common knowledge, but that knowledge must often be learned. It is not su¢ cient for me to learn the gameother players must learn as well. Cripps et al (2008) provide a simple example in which the size of the parameter space de…ning the game determines whether common learning occurs.
In somewhat more light-hearted work, Fudenberg and Levine (2006) ask why superstitions persist even in a world that many believe to be rational. They show that superstitions may survive so long as they rely upon o¤-equilibrium beliefs that are two steps o¤ the equilibrium path. This work provides explanations for currently popular superstitions as well as a framework for the design of religion.
Second, there is a growing empirical literature in psychology concerning the speci…c question of this paper: are experts even expert and, if so, when? Repeated studies have found examples in which expert opinion can be less accurate than non-expert opinion, and can even be less accurate than simple models of which the expert should be aware (See Camerer and Johnson, 1991, for an early review). 4 There is signi…cant work showing that information often reduces the precision of predictions. 5 Information also serves to make those making predictions more con…dent of their predictions, implying a negative relationship between con…dence and accuracy.
Once it is clear that many experts are not expert when it comes to prediction and forecasting, a natural question is what makes some better than others? Tetlock (2006) , for example, separates experts that form opinions using a single, dominant world-view from those that look at each situation on a case-by-case basis, and …nds that the latter are both more accurate and less con…dent. This literature is quite large and, to some extent, complementary to the model that I present in this paper. I show that even if people/experts are not inherently overcon…dent, they will tend to be overcon…dent in their area of expertise due to the endogenous sorting of experts into areas of expertise. Further, the more con…dent they are, the less accurate they will be. Rather than explore how properties of the individual correlate with accuracy, as much of the work in psychology 4 For example, Dawes, Faust and Meehl (1989) show that doctors are less accurate in predicting patient outcomes than a simple statistical model. Dawes and Corrigan (1974) write: "the statistical was thought to provide a ‡oor to which the judgment of the experienced clinitian could be compared. The ‡oor turned out to be a ceiling." 5 For example, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) show that Americans are better at guessing the larger of two German cities than guessing the larger of two American cities, about which they presumably know more has done, I explore how properties of questions and …elds should correlate with accuracy.
To my knowledge, this question is novel, and the method of analysis I use more is more theoretical. Further, I seek endogenous, rather than exogenous, explanations for the failure of expert predictions.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 1 provides the basic model and results concerning the decision to study a question and the implications of that decision on expert bias. Section 2 presents several examples that allow us to evaluation the evolution of knowledge and accuracy over time. These examples also provide illustrations of the general results of the preceding section. Section 3 o¤ers some mechanism design applications, and Section 4 concludes. Proofs can be found in the appendix.
The model
This model concerns a single …eld, with an exogenously given set of researchers choosing among an exogenously set number of questions is each period. At time t 1; the set of questions available for study is Q t ;where jQ t j = k t . Once a question has entered the …eld, it always remains, so Q t 1 Q t . There are N t researchers in each period who each decide on a question to study. Each researcher lives for one period and then dies.
Let the set of researchers at time t who decide to study question q 2 Q t be denoted R q;t , and let jR q;t j = n q;t 0, where P kt q=1 n q;t = N t . Each question q is de…ned by the number q , which represents "the truth". Researchers'common prior about q is that it is distributed normally with mean zero and variance 2 q;0 , and the goal of research is to learn q .
Researcher r researching question q at time t receives a signal b r;q;t = q + z r;q;t , where the standard deviation of z r;q;t is r;q;t . Researchers report their signals publicly. 6 Past reports are common knowledge, as are the precisions of those reports. Current reports about question q are only observable to researchers that also study question q, and the precisions of those reports are unknown.
Let researcher r 0 s prior of the variance of her signal of q at time t be b 2 r;q;t G r;q;t ( ) where G is increasing and di¤erentiable over the entire support [0; G], with G r;q;t (0) = 0 and G r;q;t (G) = 1. G is unknown to the researcher, but researchers are, on average, unbiased in their beliefs: E Gr;q;t (b 2 r;q;t ) = 2 r;q;t .
Let the precision of research be denoted r;q;t = 1= 2 r;q;t ; and let researcher r's belief of that precision be denoted b r;q;t = 1=b where q is the …rst period that question q enters the …eld. 7 I assume that the researcher cares about how much she has advanced knowledge: u r;q;t = u(V q ; e q;t 1 ; b r;q;t ), where u is increasing in the importance of the question, V q , decreasing in the precision of her prior, e q;t 1 , and increasing in the precision of the signal that she expects to get, b r;q;t . There are a variety of functional forms that satisfy these requirements, all of which yield qualitatively identical results to those I present below. For simplicity, I assume that her utility equals the di¤erence between the variance of the prior and the variance of the posterior if she researches the question, scaled by the value of the question, under the assumption that no other researchers study the question:
(e q;t 1 + b r;q;t ) 1 :
7 That is, q 2 Q q but q = 2 Q q 1.
Note that this utility function ignores the research that other experts do on a question. would be similar if any of these three alternatives were incorporated, but at the expense of signi…cant added complexity. By using a utility function that ignores others'choices, I
can use partial equilibrium analysis rather than searching for Nash equilibria.
Note also that I could have also de…ned her utility to be the ratio of her perceived signal precision to the precision of the current estimate of q , which would yield u r;q;t = V q b r;q;t =e q;t 1 . All comparative statics in the paper would be identical with this alternative choice for utility.
A researcher's life is as follows. She is born, and observes a vector fb r;1;t ; b r;2;t ; :::; b r;kt;t g, where b 2 r;q;t G r;q;t ( ). She then chooses a question q 2 Q t , and observes a signal b r;q;t = q +z r;q;t , where the standard deviation of z r;q;t is r;q;t . She then reports b r;q;t publicly and honestly. Researchers di¤er, and choose di¤erent questions, because b r;q;t 6 = b r 0 ;q;t for r 6 = r 0 .
After observing all reports associated with her chosen question, b r 0 ;q;t ; r 0 2 R q;t , she forms a posterior about q . In forming a posterior, she must choose a weight to place upon current work, whose quality is not contemporaneously observable. I assume that she assigns b 2 r;q;t as the variance of current work on question q, an assumption I discuss below.
Because researcher r 0 s prior for the standard deviation of z r;q;t is b r;q;t , her updated estimate of q after observing b r;q;t will put the wrong weight on her current signal relative to past signals. If b r;q;t > r;q;t , then she will put too little weight on current work, and if b r;q;t < r;q;t , she will put too much weight on current work. Ex ante, by assump-tion, E(b r;q;t ) = r;q;t . She will also assign a di¤erent weight to current work than other researchers studying the same question, so experts will disagree.
Before solving for equilibrium decisions and outcomes in the model, I discuss two assumptions. First, questions are exogenously generated over time. While this is unrealistic, it is a useful simpli…cation. Second, researchers agree on the facts about past research. This assumption may not be correct in practice, but allowing disagreement about the quality of past work would only serve to reinforce the primary conclusions of the paper while imposing a more signi…cant departure from the rational model. Third, the quality of current research is not contemporaneously observable. It takes one period for the quality of work to become known. This assumption is critical for the results: if experts observe the quality of current work in forming posteriors, there is no scope for disagreement.
Fourth, researchers assume that their priors for the quality of current work are correct.
Ex ante, they are correct on average, but after selecting into a question, they may be incorrect on average. Note that this assumption is fairly weak: there is no evidence that they could observe that their priors are incorrect, only a theoretical argument. Moreover, even if they could be persuaded by the theoretical argument, there is no way for them to know how much to adjust their beliefs about r;q;t upward, as G r;q;t is unknown. Any adjustment would be arbitrary and incorrect, with probability one. A perfectly rational and informed expert could say, at best, "I know that I am likely to be biased in favor of current work, but cannot provide any estimate of how much."
The decision to research a question q
The …rst period in which question q comes into existence is q . The number of people working on question q in periods q to t 1 is fn q; q ; n q; q +1 ; :::; n q;t 1 g. The prior for all researchers at the start of time t for question q can thus be written e q;t 1 = In period s, there are n q;s researchers, each of whom draws signal b r;q;s = q + z r;q;s , r 2 f1; 2; :::; n q;s g, with standard deviation r;q;s . These signals are reported and observed by experts. At the end of period t, expert r therefore has posterior e r;q;t = where I have noted that the posterior is unique to expert r. The posterior precision is believed by expert r to be e q;t 1 + n q;t b r;q;t . Non-experts do not observe contemporaneous research, and therefore have a posterior identical to the prior, and do not adjust the precision.
Proposition 1 A researcher is weakly more likely, ceterus paribus, to choose to study question q if:
1. She believes her signal will be more precise: b r;q;t is lower, 2. The question is newer: t q is lower, 3. Fewer researchers have worked on the question historically: n q;s is lower for any s 2 f q ; q + 1; :::; t 1g, 4. Historic signals were less precise: r;q;s is higher, s < t, for any r,
5.
The question is more important: V q is higher.
Corollary 1
Researchers are more likely to study questions that experience a rapid increase in the (i) quality of available data, (ii) quantity of available data, (iii) available methods of analysis.
These results are straightforward and, rather than being seen as novel aspects of the model, should be seen as con…rming the sensibility of the assumptions.
The precision of expert and non-expert opinion
The probability that researcher r chooses question q is
This is given by the …rst-order statistic:
where g r;q;t is the (strictly positive) derivative of G r;q;t . The probability that question q is chosen equals, for a given b r;q;t , the probability that all other questions have values of b r;q 0 ;t that are high enough to make question q the most attractive. I then integrate over all possible values of b r;q;t , multiplying by the density at b r;q;t .
I cannot calculate the expected value E(b r;qt ) analytically, but I can perform comparative statics with it relatively easily. For any set of values V q and fV q 0 ; e q 0 ;t 1 g q 0 2Qtnq ; which are known at time t, and for any draws of b r;q 0 ;t ; q 0 2 Q t nq, there exists a threshold value r;q;t 0 such that researcher r studies question q if and only if b r;q;t 2 [0; r q;t ). Therefore, if I …nd that a change in some parameter increases (decreases) the threshold r;q;t , then the expectation of b r;q;t must increase (decrease) as well.
Proposition 2 If a question q is worth studying for some vector of beliefs fb r;q 0 ;t g q 0 2Qt , then as the level of knowledge about q increases, expected expert bias weakly increases. That is, if r;q;t > 0, then
Proposition 2 establishes that as researchers learn more about a question, the bias of the researchers that continue to study it increases as well. Therefore, anything that increases the precision of knowledge about a question will also increase the level of bias among researchers studying the question. The following results are immediate:
Corollary 2 Expected expert bias is higher, ceterus paribus, if:
1. The question is older: t is higher for any given , 2. More researchers have worked on the question historically: n q;s is higher for any s 2 f q ; q + 1; :::; t 1g, 3. Historic signals were more precise: r;q;s is lower, so r;q;s is higher, for any s 2 f q ; q + 1; :::; t 1g; 4. The question is less important: V q is lower.
Not only are experts biased, but they may become so biased that they are less reliable than non-experts. Indeed, this may be quite common in practice, as many questions are "settled" in the minds of non-experts, who have moved elsewhere for research questions.
Questions for which expert opinion is less accurate than non-expert opinion feature few researchers, while those for which experts are more accurate feature many researchers.
Therefore, while a large majority of researchers may work on questions for which they truly are the best source of information, it could be the case that the majority of questions feature experts who are less reliable than non-experts.
Corollary 3 Expert opinion can be less precise than non-expert opinion.
Thus far I have focused upon the bias generated by properties of the question at the start of period t, but the likely productivity of future research is important as well. Holding constant all values V q and fV q 0 ; e q 0 ;t 1 g q 0 2Qtnq ; and draws of b r;q 0 ;t ; q 0 2 Q t nq, I can evaluate how the level of bias changes as the productivity of current research, r;q;t , changes. To do this, I write b r;q;t = K r;q;t so that E(K) = 1. The distribution of b r;q;t is G r;q;t ( ), so the distribution of K can be denoted H r;q;t (x= r;q;t ) G r;q;t (x), which has support [0; G= r;q;t ]
and density h r;q;t ( ). The following result is immediate:
As the precision of current research on a question increases, expected expert bias decreases.
Proposition 3 should not be surprising: as the productivity of current research rises, more researchers will choose question q. The marginal researcher is less optimistic than the average. Expected bias therefore falls. This fact has important empirical implications.
When research on a question becomes more productive, whether via newly available data, new techniques, new paradigms, etc., researchers studying the question will be more accurate in their opinions. I explore this result further in Section 3 as it relates to the age of researchers.
The relationship between the …eld and the question
I have focused thus far upon how the properties of the question a¤ect the choice of potential researchers to study the question, and the quality of their posteriors. An equally interesting analysis focuses upon the properties of the …eld more generally, and how that a¤ects bias on a question. Fast growing …elds will feature particularly biased experts when it comes to older questions. The reason is that quickly growing …elds will siphon o¤ many researchers into new questions where the fruit is low-hanging. Researchers who choose to study old questions in quickly expanding …elds must believe that the precision of their signals about those old questions is very high to be willing to forgo the option to research a new questions. On average, this implies that they are signi…cantly biased. In slowlygrowing …elds, there are few new questions to research, so researchers are forced to study old questions, regardless of their bias. The average researcher on one of these questions, then, is not particularly biased.
For example, medicine is a …eld that is currently growing quickly, with new questions, methods, and opportunities arising frequently. One must wonder, therefore, who continues to study the e¤ect of cigarettes on lung cancer. While the question is not completely understood (nor should it ever be, according to the model), it is highly studied and future work likely has a low likelihood of impact. Researchers who choose to study it now are likely very biased in favor of current work, more so because other opportunities abound.
For another example, history is a …eld that is growing slowly, with only one year of new history being created each year. A young researcher must choose some question to study, but there are few opportunities for seminal work in a …eld with such slow question generation. Therefore, a researcher choosing to study the fall of the Roman Empire is likely to be less biased because there are few other opportunities for work that are clearly superior.
Proposition 4 For old questions, experts are more biased if the …eld is growing more quickly: E(b r;q;t ) is weakly decreasing in k t , ceterus paribus. r;q;t approaches 2 r;q;t from above, experts move from putting too little weight on current work to putting the correct weight on current work. They will report greater posterior precision, and will actually have greater posterior precision. As b 2 r;q;t passes 2 r;q;t and continues to fall, experts will report greater precision, but their posteriors will have less precision: they put too much weight on current work. In this range, then, there is a negative relationship between reported accuracy and actual accuracy.
Expert con…dence and accuracy
When the …eld is large and there are many interesting questions, most researchers will choose a question for which b 2 r;q;t < 2 r;q;t . Therefore, the empirical domain of b 2 r;q;t will tend to be that for which there is a negative relationship between expert con…dence and accuracy. I provide a representative example in Section 2.4.
I now turn to some numerical examples to elucidate the preceding results.
Numerical examples
The selection of researchers into questions drives bias in a relatively straightforward way.
In order to clarify the preceding results, and provide some additional intuition for the evolution of expertise over time, I now present some numerical examples. The examples involve deterministic priors in order to allow for analytical results.
First, I assume a non-random distribution of potential experts arriving each period and show, for a variety of parameters, how the quality of expert and non-expert opinion evolves over time. For simplicity, I assume one question and a …xed outside option u, which is appropriate for a large, growing …eld. 8 Second, I shock the quality of data and map impulse-response functions to see how changes in the research technology a¤ect the quality and quantity of research on the question.
Third, I assume two questions in the …eld, but remove the outside option. This analysis will allow me to study how the quality of one question in a …eld a¤ects the bias of researchers in another question in the same …eld. It will also allow us to see how the preceding results change when the …eld is static, rather than growing. I show that, over time, the …eld reaches a steady-state in which all experts are less reliable than non-experts. This is because the importance of incremental information must tend to zero over time, while the average bias does not. In a static …eld, experts simply cannot be relied upon.
I also show that the quality of expert opinion within a …eld can oscillate between two questions, as researchers ‡ock from one to the other, appearing to chase trends. In the long run, more important questions will be more heavily researched and better understood, but in the short run, when the impact of new research is relatively large, researchers may oscillate between choosing questions that are important, and those that are relatively less studied.
The quality of opinion over time in a large, growing …eld
Let there be one question q, with r;q;t = 1 for all t > 0 and 2 q;0 = 0:1, and let q = 1.
Let there be 39 potential researchers every period, r 2 f1; 2; :::; 39g, and let b 2 r;q;t = r=20, so b r;q;t ) = 2 r;q;t = 1. I represent the existence of other questions as a …xed outside option, u. The fact that the quality of the outside option is unchanging is consistent with a large …eld that is growing over time, so that good opportunities for research consistently arise.
The upper graphs in Figure 1 plot the precision of expert and non-expert estimates of q over time, for values of the question relative to the outside option of V q =u = 10; 000 and V q =u = 100; 000. The lower graphs plot the number of researchers, out of 39, that choose to study q over the outside option.
When V q =u = 100; 000, shown in the left-hand graphs, the question is very important relative to the outside option, driving all 39 potential experts to study q in early periods.
Non-experts, if they were to exist, would have access only to the prior, which has a precision of 10, while experts have access to all 39 expert reports as well, and are on average unbiased.
The median expert opinion will be unbiased and have precision of 49, nearly …ve times the precision of a non-expert opinion. As the number of periods increases, non-experts gain access to this information and gain precision. Once some potential experts begin to choose the outside option, in period 7, the increasing bias and information over time o¤set, leading the precision of expert opinion to level o¤. The same is not true for non-experts, who become better informed and more reliable.
When V q =u = 10; 000, shown in the right-hand graphs, all potential experts choose to study the question in period 1. Beginning in period 2, many or most potential experts choose the outside option, reducing the rate of knowledge growth and reducing the quality of expert opinion. It is interesting to note that expert opinion does not, under these parameters, become more precise over time. The increase in knowledge is met with an approximately corresponding increase in bias in favor of current work, yielding approximately constant precision over time.
These examples highlight that experts will generally be less expert when questions are old and well studied.
The quality of opinion and shocks to the research technology
It should be intuitively clear that when research becomes more e¤ective, potential researchers are more willing to study a question. An increase in e¢ cacy could be through improved technology (e.g., the development of computers), improved theory (e.g., the marginal revolution or capital asset pricing model), improved data availability (e.g., new proprietary sources of data), or increased funding (e.g., additional grants from the NSF). Each of these changes can be modeled in this framework with a reduction in r;q;t at time t: the impact of a …xed e¤ort toward research yields an improved signal of the truth. In Figure   2 , I plot our four graphs from Figure 1 , with a small change. At time t = 7, 2 r;q;t drops from 1 to 0.1: research is ten times as e¤ective.
In the upper-left graph, representing the case where the question is very important, the drop in does not a¤ect the level of bias among experts because all potential experts choose to study q both before and after the drop in . Despite this, the quality of research produced increases signi…cantly because of the drop in , meaning that experts become much better informed than non-experts, who lack access to current research. In later periods, the drop in the number of researchers studying q more than o¤sets the improved productivity of research, and expert opinion stagnates, while non-expert option continues to improve.
In the upper-right graph, representing the case where the question is not very important, expert and non-expert opinion sharply diverge when falls, as many researchers decide to study q, both increasing the knowledge available only to experts, and reducing their average bias. Over the subsequent periods, non-experts gain access to this new information, sharply increasing the precision of their opinions. Meanwhile, the opportunity for novel research falls, leading to even greater selection against unbiased experts than prior to the drop in .
These examples highlight that shocks to the research technology are accompanied by
shocks to the quality of expert opinion. The quality of the technology itself is less relevant than changes to that technology. When looking for external indicators of whether experts are to be believed, look for changes in the processing and creation of knowledge.
2.3
The evolution of expert opinion in a small, static …eld Figure 3 plots the precision of expert and non-expert opinion for two questions when there is no outside option. These two questions comprise the entire …eld, which is therefore static. These …gures help clarify how changes to one question in a …eld a¤ect properties of opinion regarding the other question.
There are …ve potential values of b r;q;t for each question q 2 fQ1; Q2g, and the spread between them is de…ned by Spread q 2 [0; 1=2), a parameter I allow to vary: b r;q;t 2 f1 2 Spread q; 1 Spread q; 1; 1 + Spread q; 1 + 2 Spread qg:
For simplicity, there is one researcher for each pair fb r;Q1;t ; b r;Q2;t g, so there are 25 researchers in the …eld. The upper …gure in Figure 3 assumes that Spread Q1 = SpreadQ2 = 0:4, so b r;q;t takes values of 0.2, 0.6, 1, 1.4, and 1.8 for each question. 9 Initially, the experts for both questions have more precise opinions than non-experts, but as the marginal importance of current work decreases, the bias overcomes the bene…t of knowledge of current work.
In the lower …gure in Figure 3 , the prior precisions are raised to 5 for both questions, and the spread for question Q1 is reduced to 0.1. Beliefs about r;q;t are less di¤use for question Q1, so the types who choose question Q1 are less biased. This does not a¤ect the level of bias for researchers in question Q2, but clearly shows that experts can be superior sources of information, even if biased, for an extended period. In deciding whether to query an expert or non-expert, a policy-maker or manager must consider the dispersion of beliefs about q;t . is more important, most researchers choose question Q1 in period 1, with only the most biased in favor of Q2 choosing to study Q2. In period 2, however, question Q1 has been relatively heavily studied, causing researchers to ‡ock to question Q2, even though it is less important. In period 3, the questions are again equally well studied, and researchers return to question Q1. This means that the level of bias among experts oscillates as well, with high bias in periods when the question is less studied. Over time, as the value of marginal research decreases, a steady-state is reached in which the types choosing each question are constant and question Q1 receives more research than Q2.
Expert con…dence and accuracy in a large, growing …eld
To evaluate the relationship between actual and self-assessed expert accuracy, I return to the assumptions in Section 2.1, representing a question in a large, growing …eld. Figure 5 plots the precision of expert reports on the vertical axis and the expert's belief of her precision on the horizontal axis, assuming V q =u = 10; 000. In period 1, all potential researchers study the question. Increasing self-assessed precision is associated with more optimistic priors, i.e., lower draws of b r;q;t < 2 r;q;t , increasing perceived precision is associated with decreased actual precision. These researchers already put too much weight on current work, and increasing that weight further is not helpful.
The linear regression line is plotted as well, showing that the observed relationship between self-assessed and actual accuracy is negative, even without a selection bias. This is due to a modeling assumption. I assumed that E(b r;q;t . 10 Had I assumed that E(b r;q;t ) = r;q;t , this negative relationship would not be present without any selection bias.
In the right panel, the same scatter is presented for experts in period 5. Many potential experts choose the outside option, so only optimistic experts remain. Among this group, there is a clear negative relationship between self-assessed and actual precisions. Because there is, in practice, always some selection into any question, we should expect that this negative relationship will be the empirical norm.
1 0 An easy way to see this is to imagine a simple distribution of Gr;q;t, which assigns a 50% probability to a draw of b 2 r;q;t = 0 and a 50% probability to a draw of b 2 r;q;t = 2 2 r;q;t . The posterior of the former researcher will be formed entirely of current work, and the reported precision will be in…nite. The posterior of the latter will put too little weight on current work, and the posterior precision will be …nite. Even without selection bias, the negative relationship will be present.
Which experts should be consulted?
Thus far, there has been little discussion of which experts should be consulted and how their opinions should be weighed. This is because experts are functionally identical in the current model. In practice, however, there may be many experts for a given question, and policy-makers and managers may have limited ability to query them. It is therefore important to address precisely which experts should be consulted in a given case.
In this section, I split experts along two dimensions. First, experts may be older or younger. The prior results naturally extend to the bias of experts at di¤erent points in their careers. I will argue that older experts are typically more reliable than younger, with the exception that shocks to the research technology can make younger researchers temporarily more reliable. Older researchers that study, for example, severe recessions, were likely better sources of information than younger researchers before the recession of 2008 but, post-recession, younger researchers may be more reliable for some time. Indeed, this cohort of researchers is likely to be the most reliable source of expertise on business cycle macroeconomics for their entire careers.
Second, experts may be academic or professional, in the sense that they may choose research questions for intrinsic or extrinsic reasons. Professional experts may be less able to discern the truth, but also lack the bias that comes from selecting into an area of expertise. For older questions, like macroeconomic forecasting, professionals are likely to be more reliable than academics while for new questions, like the relationship between speci…c genes and cancers, academics may be superior.
This analysis also has implications for task assignment within a …rm: allowing workers to choose areas of expertise may make them happier, induce e¤ort, and reduce wage bills, but it also likely leads to bias in their beliefs. There are similar implications for hiring:
should a hedge fund hire workers who have advanced degrees in …nance or in physics?
The former have more knowledge of …nancial markets, but are likely biased about their functioning.
For the most part, the claims in this section follow immediately from the intuition in the model, so I do not prove them formally.
The e¤ect of expert age on precision
To understand the e¤ect of expert age, I must introduce some variation along this dimension. I allow researchers to live for s periods, rather than one, but require that they maintain their initial question for their full careers. A more important assumption concerns how I assign expert beliefs when they are older. One option would be to allow a new, independent draw of b r;q;t . This would clearly imply that older experts would be unbiased, on average, and therefore clearly the best source of information. I do not believe this is a particularly reasonable assumption, given that biases are likely to persist, even if in weakened form, throughout a career. I assume instead that the level of bias is …xed over time. De…ne K r;q;t = b r;q;t = r;q;t to be the proportionate bias for researcher r on question q in the …rst period of the her career. I assume that K r;q;t = K r;q;t 0 for t 6 = t 0 , so her bias on all questions is constant.
Allowing partial or full mean-reversion would strengthen the results.
By assumption, the only di¤erence, on average, between researchers of di¤erent ages is the level of selection into a question when the researcher was young. I therefore abstract from other di¤erences that may occur in practice, such as di¤erences in awareness of the literature, research e¤ort, intellectual ‡exibility, etc. Results below should therefore be seen as ceterus paribus.
Application: Tenure letters and the preference for "grey hair"
It is typical for universities to solicit views of faculty at other schools in reviewing a professor's tenure case. The "letter-writers"are typically very senior, but it is not clear why this should be so. Less senior faculty often publish papers at equally high rates, suggesting a similar level of knowledge about a candidate's contribution. Indeed, one could argue that older faculty are more likely to be academically disengaged, delegating work to research assistants and spending more time with their families. This paper provides some support for the focus on "grey hair": Claim 1 In expanding …elds, at a given time, older researchers have more precise opinions.
In static …elds, at any given time, the precision of opinions is un-correlated with age.
The intuition is straightforward, and follows immediately from Corollary 2: as a question ages, more is known about it. So long as there are new questions to draw researcher interest, those researchers who choose to study the older question are increasingly biased over time.
Older researchers chose to study the question when it was less well understood, so are less biased on average.
If the …eld is static, however, no new questions arise: all questions age together so there is no worsening selection into any given question. When younger researchers start their careers, all questions are better understood than when their elders began as researchers, so the decision to choose one question over another does not involve increasing selection.
Because most …elds are expanding, it is typical that older faculty may be more able to judge the quality of a candidate's contribution because they are less biased about the importance of current work in the candidate's area. Younger faculty su¤er, potentially, from an inverse problem, in which the less impactful is current work, the more impactful they believe it to be! Older faculty, having chosen research questions long ago, are more able to note the lack of interesting work done on those questions and can report this to a candidate's school. However, provosts and deans should note that the "grey hair" preference in tenure letters should be reconsidered in slowly expanding or static …elds like History, in which there are few new question and little new data.
Application: New information and the preference for youth
There is an important counter-example, however, to the claim that older experts tend to be less biased.
Claim 2 There will sometimes arise a "golden cohort" of researchers working on a question, a group whose opinions are more accurate than contemporaries at all points of their careers. These cohorts arise when there is a signi…cant drop in q at the time they are choosing questions.
This drop makes current work impactful, and draws in researchers, even if they are not particularly biased. This is a rare case in which young researchers are more reliable than old. This cohort stays with the question over time, and remain less biased than younger cohorts who start their careers when more is known about the question, and incremental research is therefore less valuable. An especially stark example is shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 2 . A recent, important example may be business-cycle macroeconomics. Macroeconomic data are not generated quickly -recessions are blissfully infrequent. It can be argued that, at least in the West, there was little new business cycle data generated in the decades leading to the great recession. The recession, however, provides a wealth of data, as di¤erent states and countries have experienced di¤erent types and degrees of shocks, and responded with highly varied monetary and …scal policies. It remains to be seen, though I believe it likely, whether this recession yields a golden cohort in business cycle macroeconomics.
The decision to become an expert and precision
Expert opinion can be less precise than non-expert opinion because selection into studying a question yields researchers who are biased in favor of current research. This naturally implies that the problem can be solved by changing researchers'utility functions. I asserted at the outset that researchers are motivated by the search for knowledge, but there are clearly other motivations that I could have assumed.
Consider the following change to the model. After a researcher chooses a question, she forms a posterior Pr q;t . A noisy signal of the truth is publicly observed, M q;t = q + m q;t , where m q;t is an independent mean zero random variable with precision M q;t . The researcher receives utility based upon making accurate predictions about important topics:
. The researcher's perceived expected utility would then be u r;q;t = E V q Pr q;t M q;t 2 j b r;q;t . 11 With these preferences, it should be clear which forces drive entry to a question.
Proposition 5 An expert with preferences u r;q;t = E V q Pr q;t M q;t 2 j b r;q;t is weakly more likely, ceterus paribus, to study question q if:
1. She believes her signal will be more precise: b r;q;t is lower, 2. The prior signal precision is higher: e q;t 1 is higher, 3. The question is more important: V q is higher.
While a researcher with these preferences will still choose questions for which she is more biased, she also will choose questions for which there is more prior knowledge, counteracting this bias. Indeed, depending upon parameters, experts may be more reliable than nonexperts for all questions. This alternative utility function may be implementable in practice,
and two examples are provided below. Proposition 5 establishes that professional experts choose questions for which there is signi…cant prior research, because this helps them form accurate -and pro…table -beliefs.
Academics shy away from these questions because the marginal impact of their work is likely to be low. Therefore, when choosing an expert to query, the manager or policymaker must …rst determine how heavily researched is the question.
Application: Task assignment and hiring
Managers often face a problem of task-assignment, one important element of which is the delegation of decision-making to a worker. In the setting of this paper, I can consider whether a worker should be allowed to choose a question to research or have that question assigned.
For example, consider a lender assigning employees to build a risk model. It is reasonable to assume that employees would be weakly harder working if allowed to choose their focuses, but there could be signi…cant bias implicit in their choices. Suppose that pay-down behavior has been heavily studied at the lender, and many elements of paydown behavior are already used in the risk model. Then an employee given discretion who still chooses to focus on pay-down behavior may be severely biased. The model suggests, therefore, that young …rms with many novel jobs to do should allow more employee discretion, while older …rms, whose jobs are more "maintenance"than "construction"should allow less.
These insights apply to hiring as well. 
Conclusion
This paper is dedicated to the development and application of a simple insight: the selection into an area of expertise implies a bias on the part of experts. When the selection is strong, experts may not, in fact, be expert, in the sense that they are not the best sources of available information. This insight immediately raises two questions. First, how can a policy-maker or manager distinguish between experts who are more and less reliable,
given that the experts themselves cannot? Properties of the question are useful in this regard: questions that are less important, more highly researched, and for which there is little new data, few new tools, etc., are subject to more severe selection bias, and imply more questionable expertise. These implications are fairly general, and should apply in essentially any model that captures the basic insight of this paper. Attributes of the expert are also useful: older experts, those who entered when new data and tools were becoming available, and those who are extrinsically motivated will often be more reliable. The result concerning golden cohorts should generalize to most any model, while the results that older and more extrinsically motivated experts are more precise should be seen as conditional on equal skill and ability. Finally, the expert's self-reported con…dence in her posterior is also a useful guide to her accuracy. Experts who express greater con…dence are less precise.
This implication of the model aligns well with empirical work, and arises endogenously.
Second, how should we design mechanisms to solve this problem? There are a surprising number of settings where this insight has implications for mechanism design, within and outside academia.
1. Tenure letter writers: The results concerning age suggest a rationale for asking older researchers to write tenure letters. Assuming that letter writers should have the same area of expertise as the candidate, it is important to maximize the expertise of the person evaluating the candidate.
2. The refereeing process: Journals should generally require both expert (referee) and non-expert (editor) opinions. The expert judges the quality of work within the question (e.g., by observing a signal of the value of r;q;t associated with the report), and the non-expert judges the likely bias in the question more generally. Because experts disagree, it may be useful to ask multiple experts (referees). Because non-experts agree, one non-expert (editor) is su¢ cient.
3. Hiring: One might imagine that it is superior to hire intrinsically motivated agents, as the individual rationality constraint may be more easily met, the greater the utility the agent gets from working. Intrinsic motivation, however, is the source of selection bias that yields biased experts. The principal should determine whether the motivation existed prior to learning of past work on the question. If so, then the motivation re ‡ects inherent interest and is bene…cial for the employer. If the interest arose or was strengthened after the agent began to study the question, however, this may imply likely bias. An example would be a hedge fun hiring a Ph.D. in …nance or physics. The former may be more knowledgeable and easier to train, but also chose a course of study that may suggest bias.
4. Task assignment: Similar to the hiring problem, a principal could choose how to assign employees to tasks. While employees likely prefer discretion in their area of expertise, random assignment may be superior to discretion, as it eliminates the source of bias once they become expert. For example, it is common for PhD students in the sciences to become expert in whatever questions senior researchers in the department happen to ask. While there is some discretion regarding which lab or program to choose, it is limited. In the social sciences, the opportunity for self-directed study is greater.
This suggests the potential for greater bias among researchers in the social sciences than the hard sciences.
The fact that research experts tend to be biased, importantly, does not suggest that the method by which people choose to become researchers should be changed. Knowledge about questions increases over time as those questions are researched, regardless of whether the contemporaneous researchers themselves have a biased view of the quality of their work.
It is only in soliciting their views that outsiders must be careful to account for this bias. Proof of Proposition 3. As r;q;t decreases, G r;q;t (x) increases for all x 2 [0; G= r;q;t ].
For every set of values fe 2 q 0 ;t 1 ; V q 0 g q 0 2Qtnq and V q , the threshold for a researcher to choose question q is r;q;t . I show that expected bias is increasing in r;q;t for any given values fe 2 q 0 ;t 1 ; V q 0 g q 0 2Qtnq and V q , so it is increasing in r;q;t . The expected bias given fe 2 q 0 ;t 1 ; V q 0 g q 0 2Qtnq and V q is E(K j r chosen) = 1 Hr;q;t( r;q;t= r;q;t) R r;q;t= r;q;t 0 xh r;q;t (x)dx.
Taking a derivative with respect to r;q;t yields d d r;q;t E(K j r chosen) = h r;q;t ( r;q;t = r;q;t ) r;q;t [H r;q;t ( r;q;t = r;q;t ) r;q;t ] 2 Z r;q;t= r;q;t 0 xh r;q;t (x)dx h r;q;t ( r;q;t = r;q;t ) H r;q;t ( r;q;t = r;q;t ) r;q;t r;q;t r;q;t 2 = h r;q;t ( r;q;t = r;q;t ) H r;q;t ( r;q;t = r;q;t )
" Z r;q;t= r;q;t 0 xh r;q;t (x)dx r;q;t r;q;t # = h r;q;t ( r;q;t = r;q;t ) H r;q;t ( r;q;t = r;q;t ) E(K j K r;q;t r;q;t ) r;q;t r;q;t
:
The …rst term is positive and the second is negative, so the product is negative.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Recall that the threshold value of b r;q;t such that question q is studied is r;q;t = (V q =V q 0 )e Increasing the number of questions at time t from k t to k 0 t is equivalent to the set of questions increasing from Q t to Q 0 t , where Q t Q 0 t . The min operator is weakly decreasing as arguments are added, so letting q 00 (r; q; t) = arg min m e is increasing in b r;q;t , so u r;q;t is decreasing in b r;q;t . Part 2 follows because Pr q;t is decreasing in e q;t 1 , so u r;q;t is increasing in Pr q;t .
Part 3 follows because u r;q;t increases one for one with V q . Figure 1: The upper two …gures display expert and non-expert precision for a more (left) and a less (right) important question, over time. The bottom …gures display the number of researchers, out of a potential 39, choosing those questions over the outside option.
Figures
As the marginal contribution of research decreases, researchers begin choosing the outside option, and the bias among experts outweighs their superior knowledge. These …gures are appropriate for a large, growing …eld. The upper two …gures display expert and non-expert precision for a more (left) and a less (right) important question, over time. The bottom …gures display the number of researchers, out of a potential 39, choosing those questions over the outside option. As the marginal contribution of research decreases, researchers begin choosing the outside option, and the bias among experts outweighs their superior knowledge. At t = 7, the research technology becomes 10 times more productive, causing a surge of work and improving the quality of expert opinion. The surge is temporary. These …gures are appropriate for a large, growing …eld. Figure 3 : These …gures display average expert and non-expert precision over time when the …eld has two questions and no outside option. In the top …gure, the questions are identical. Even though the types of expert choosing the question do not change over time, the marginal impact of their work decreases, so the problem of bias eventually overtakes the bene…t of that marginal work. In the bottom …gure, the distribution of expert beliefs is four times wider for question Q2 than for question Q1. This does not a¤ect the types choosing to study each question, but means that the bias in question Q1 is not su¢ cient, in only 10 periods, to make experts in that question less reliable than non-experts. Figure 4 : These …gures plot the precision of expert and non-expert opinion for a …eld with two questions and no outside option. Question Q1 is twice as important, but otherwise the questions are identical. In the …rst few periods, researchers oscillate between choosing the question that is more important and the one that is less researched. This yields oscillation in the quality of expert opinion. At any given time, the less studied question features experts that are little better than non-experts, while the heavily studied question features superior experts. In the long run, a steady-state is reached in which more researchers choose the more important question. 
